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The paper analyses the development of the merit system 
and its effectiveness in the administrations of the West-
ern Balkan countries. The origins and benefit of the merit 
system are described in the article. The basic hypothesis is 
that in most Western Balkan countries the spoils system 
remains a reality, despite the fact that the law stipulates 
the merit system. The main argument for this hypothesis 
is based on one element of the merit system, and that is 
recruitment and employment in the public services sector. 
This segment of the merit system is most often violated 
because public service employment in the Western Balkans 
is not obtained objectively, i.e., from a pool of best can-
didates, but given to those who support the ruling party, 
which is particularly evident during election campaigns. 
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The paper analyses this phenomenon and points out that 
the so-called reliable votes are the core of the problem. The 
article explains this phenomenon and provides guidance 
on possible solutions to the identified problems.
Keywords: spoils system, merit system, public administra-
tion, political party, reliable vote
1.  Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to refer to and highlight the problem of party 
employment in public sector organisations (public services, public institu-
tions, public companies), of the Western Balkan countries with particular 
focus on Serbia. The term party recruitment, or just party employment, en-
tails the process by which parties recruit members in the public adminis-
tration, public services and public enterprises based on their loyalty to the 
party, which is especially prominent during an election campaign. This is 
contrary to the principles of the merit system, according to which recruit-
ment should be based on the objective qualities of the candidates for pub-
lic administration, and procedures and regulations that are independent 
of the centres of political power. The mentioned problem lies at the core 
of the main hypothesis of this paper, which is that the spoils system has 
survived in practice, despite the formal introduction of the merit system. 
It should be stressed at the beginning that although the consequences are 
felt in the societies of the Western Balkans, there are not many reliable 
scientific works, or unambiguous conclusions based on strict scientific 
methodology that deal with this problem. The reason is that the actors in-
volved in party recruitment carefully cover up all related activities. There-
fore, dealing with this problem is a thankless job and the researcher has 
two options: either not to deal with it due to a lack of scientific elements, 
or to address the issues at the risk of being labeled as methodologically 
inconsistent.
The author of this paper opted for the second option, keeping in mind the 
approaches characteristic of public policy science: the problem-solution 
approach, and the different types of public problems depending on their 
structure (structured, moderately structured, and unstructured problems). 
Firstly, the key relation within public policy science is the problem-solu-
tion relation (Jones, 1984, p. 23). In addition, prescriptiveness is an essen-
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tial feature of public policy study and analysis. This means that research 
papers should contribute not only to the scientific observation of the sub-
ject, but to the improvement of practice by suggesting a course of action 
or guidelines by which the problem may be solved (Jones, 1984, p. 23). 
From a methodological and concise point of view, this prescription con-
sists of the identification and research of a problem, and the identification 
of possible solutions to the given problem. Whether and to what extent 
both goals will be achieved depends on the state of the problem (level 
of structuring). Namely, the role and capability of science depends on 
whether one is dealing with structured or unstructured problems (Hiss-
chemöller & Hoppe, 1996). In short, when it comes to unstructured prob-
lems, the scientist plays the role of the problem recogniser, whereas when 
it comes to structured problems, the scientist is in the role of problem 
solver (Hisschemöller, Hoppe, Groenewegen & Midden, 2001).1
The subject of this paper is a problem that can be defined as badly struc-
tured or even unstructured. Therefore, the goal of this text is to recognise 
and advocate for the problem. In addition, this paper should encourage 
new research related to this topic in order to validate or refute the pre-
sented hypotheses, standpoints, and possible solutions. 
If we consider that party recruitment in the public sector, as a key ele-
ment of the merit system, is a hidden problem, although there are many 
indications of its existence and its consequences are very damaging to the 
public interest, this paper should contribute to the first phase of public 
policy analysis, i.e., framing and defining the problem, and indicating its 
existence, indicators and consequences.
In order to adequately understand this problem, it is necessary to point to 
the historical genesis of the merit system, specifically that of the Western 
Balkan countries, as well as to the political parties that play a key role in 
both introducing and suppressing the formally introduced merit system.
This research is a qualitative one2 and includes specific sources and types 
of data. Among them, and especially used in this research, are interviews, 
observations, as well as narrative analysis. Observation implies that the 
1 Specifically, the cited article refers to the following: “Problems of different structure 
means scientists in different roles” (Hisschemöller et al. 2001, p. 447). Besides the above 
mentioned roles (the scientist as a recogniser and the scientist as a solver), the article states 
that a scientist can also play the role of advocate (when it comes to moderately structured 
problems), and the role of mediator (in the case of badly structured problems).
2 More information on the differences between qualitative and quantitative research 
can be found in Qualitative Data, Analysis, and Design (Suter, 2012, pp. 347-348).
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researcher positions himself within the natural circumstances of the phe-
nomenon that he observes and investigates and records his observations 
and conclusions. Narrative analysis is a kind of qualitative research in 
which raw data is derived from human stories and experience. These ap-
proaches also require some specific skills, such as “reading between the 
lines” (Poland & Pederson, 1998, pp. 293-312; Sturma & Emmelhainz, 
2019, pp. 389-398).
2.  Spoils vs. Merit: The Emergence and 
Development of the Merit System
The spoils system (also called patronage), implies that a political party 
that is victorious in the elections gets the right to freely, and according to 
their own will, appoint people within the administration and public organ-
isations, just as it has the right to appoint a minister for a particular port-
folio. In contrast, in a merit system, a ruling political party (or coalition), 
appoints its people only to key political positions for a limited period of 
time, whilst within the administration professionals are recruited accord-
ing to their qualities and based on public competition.3 These individuals 
are permanently employed in the public administration and do not leave 
their position should the government shift. 
The spoils system can be identified as old and anachronistic, since it origi-
nates from a period when political authority was the absolute master, which 
is not in line with modern democratic trends. In addition, all democratic 
states have introduced a merit system, and there are almost no politicians 
who will not publicly support the idea of the merit system. This is similar 
to democracy. States are often formally democratic and almost every politi-
cian will say that he is a democrat, yet despite this not all democratic states 
are equally democratic, nor are all politicians who claim to be democrats 
truly democrats (such as can be seen in fledgling democracies or hybrid re-
gimes). The evasion of the merit system springs from the fact that a position 
within the public administration is in reality often awarded as a reward for 
political services performed, most often during an election campaign, with 
3 The merit system nowadays refers primarily to the civil service system and implies 
that upon admission into public service, the education (qualifications) and personal quali-
ties of the candidates are valued. In addition, the merit system implies that employees are 
grouped, paid and promoted according to their abilities, commitment to work and results 
achieved.
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the key criterion being party loyalty, whereby the admission procedure is 
only formally done according to law and regulation.
When it comes to the emergence of merit systems as cornerstone events, the 
following two should be mentioned: the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report 
in the UK; and the assassination of President Garfield in 1881, an event 
that shook the United States, with the subsequent adoption of the Pendleton 
Civil Service Reform Act – a federal law that virtually introduced the merit 
system into the federal government, which meant that most positions in the 
federal government would be awarded based on the merit system. The ideas 
from the Northcote-Trevelyan Report were the basis of this law.
In 1854, the British Conservative politician Stafford Northcote, and the 
official, Charles Trevelyan, drafted the Northcote-Trevelyan Report in 
the United Kingdom, condemning the current administration system as 
unprofessional, based on nepotism and patronage. It stated that govern-
ance could not be exercised and implemented “without the assistance of 
a capable body, made up of permanent civil servants, who are properly 
subordinate to ministers, who are directly responsible to the Crown and 
Parliament, but who still possess sufficient independence, capacity and 
experiences so that they can advise, assist and occasionally influence those 
above them” (Stančetić, 2015b, p. 74). On this occasion, they additionally 
made four suggestions to improve the system of that time: recruitment for 
work in public administration should be conducted on the basis of merit 
and open competitive examinations; entrants should have a good general 
education and should be recruited to a unified Civil Service rather than a 
specific department, to allow inter-departmental transfers; recruits should 
be positioned in the hierarchical structure of classes and grades; and pro-
motions should be based on merit and not on the basis of one’s patronage, 
position purchase, or the personal preferences of superiors.
These elements are still crucial in the modern merit system. That said 
however, the most common deviation from the ideals of the merit system 
occurs within the first element: recruitment and admission to public ser-
vice. There is another important issue to note, which comes up with the 
introduction of the merit system in the US, and that is the necessity of 
a merit system. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report came into existence in 
the mid-19th century in Britain when, with the industrial revolution in full 
swing and the specialisation and complication of state affairs taking place, 
it became clear that the fate of Britain’s further development was deter-
mined by the quality of public governance and administration, and that by 
not taking action on this issue the state would run into serious problems.
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The situation was similar in the US. Specifically in 1881, when the United 
States was shaken by the assassination of President Garfield by his party 
counterpart who was upset because he had not received the reward he had 
expected for his services during the presidential campaign. This event led to 
a public awakening and the realisation that “the spoils system is a huge pub-
lic evil”.4 It should be noted that the evils of the spoils system were talked 
and written about in the US media decades before the event. The Garfield 
assassination was simply the final trigger and a call for the abolishment of 
the spoils system and the introduction of the merit system. It happened two 
years later with the adoption of the Pendleton Act. The law introduced the 
Civil Service Commission, which played a significant role in the selection of 
the personnel in public administration, but which also insured that public 
servants were protected from the influence of politicians.5
The last years of the 19th and first decades of the 20th century were char-
acterised by the public and academics’ enthusiasm for the idea of  a merit 
system. For example, a scholarly article published in 1917 in The American 
Political Science Review stated that “there is no question of national policy 
being firmly established as the merit system” (McIlhenny, 1917, p. 461). It 
also stated that the development and improvement of the practical meth-
ods of the merit system in recent years had been rapid not merely in the 
federal service, but in the great municipalities of the country. Out of the 
total of public employees in the United States, federal, state, county, mu-
nicipal, and village, as many as 600,000, or nearly two-thirds of the entire 
number, were withdrawn from the spoils system and appointed upon a 
merit basis under laws intended to regulate and improve the public service 
(McIlhenny, 1917, p. 462). The article The Rise and Progress of the Merit 
System, reads enthusiastically about the merit system in the early years of 
4 The reaction of the whole country was mirrored in the text of the influential Harpers’ 
Weekly Magazine, edited by George William Curtis, one of the most prominent civil service 
reformers. The headline of the text was: “The Significance of Guiteau’s Crime”, which read, 
among other things, “But for the practice which we have tolerated in this country for half a 
century, and which has become constantly more threatening and perilous, Guiteau would 
not have felt that working for the party gave him a claim to reward, or a right to demand 
such a reward as his due and to feel wronged if he did not get it. This dire calamity is part 
of the penalty we pay for permitting a practice for which as a public benefit not a solitary 
word can be urged, and which, while stimulating the deadliest passions, degrades our poli-
tics and corrupts our national character. The spoils system is a vast public evil”. Source: Key 
Events: Ninety-six Premerit Years: 1789-1883, https://archive.opm.gov/biographyofanideal/
PUevents1789p01.htm#item9
5 The Commission existed in this form until the reforms of 1979, when the Office of 
Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board were created as successor 
agencies.
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the 19th century, which were dominated by the “evil of the spoils system” 
(Wheeler, 1919). Former New Mexico Senator, Carl A. Hatch, in his 1939 
speech says that “free government demands the abolition of the spoils sys-
tem. The fight against its evils began long ago” (Hatch, 1939, p. 631). Dur-
ing the 20th century, “Americans have been aware that Personnel admin-
istration is the most fundamental and important task of the head of any 
organisation as well as whenever this administrative theorem is ignored, 
the objective of the organisation is jeopardized” (Wilson, 1954, p. 87).
However, more recent research indicates that the US merit system devel-
opment has not flown smoothly or equally in all US states. Specifically, 
the Pendleton Act introduced a merit system into the federal government, 
but the states had the freedom of choice in organising their authorities, 
although there were recommendations from the federal state as well as 
public pressure to introduce the merit system in all states and at all levels.
Despite this, only Massachusetts introduced the merit system, just a year 
or two after the Pendleton Act was passed. After that, for almost two dec-
ades, there was virtually no state activity on the introduction of the merit 
system. Until 1905, when the states of Illinois and Wisconsin introduced 
it, and in the following years Colorado (1907), New Jersey (1908), Cali-
fornia (1913), Ohio (1913) and Maryland (1921). During the 1920s and 
at the end of the 1930s, only a few more states introduced the system, 
with 24 of the remaining 37 states introducing the merit system between 
1936 and 1939 (Ruhil & Camões, 2003, pp. 30-31). The key question is 
why this happened during this particular period.
The answer given by researchers refers to the importance of politicians and 
to the fact that the merit system was introduced at a moment when par-
ties and politicians did more harm than good with the spoils system. More 
specifically, they do not cite the “good will” of the politicians to introduce 
the merit system, but the objective circumstances that compelled them 
to do so, namely, nationwide and state-specific demographic, economic, 
structural, and political factors; growth in patronage constituencies; the 
use of the Australian ballot; political party competition; post-Pendleton 
dwindling patronage resources; and the onset of the Great Depression, 
that shifted politicians’ preferences for the merit principle rather than pa-
tronage (Ruhil & Camões, 2003, p. 28).
That this reasoning is not alone is borne from Canada’s experience. In 
Canada, the Civil Service Act was passed in 1919, which virtually elimi-
nated the patronage system from almost all public service. A major step 
towards professionalising the administration was the separation of per-
sonnel administration from general management. This separation not 
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only marked the end of an unambiguous executive authority over per-
sonnel management but also substantially increased the power of the 
Civil Service Commission, which guarded, protected and promoted its 
new authority. However, it is also important to mention the consensus of 
political parties to establish such an independent commission (Juillet & 
Rasmussen, 2008, p. 49).
During the 20th century, challenges emerged for the original merit sys-
tem, stemming from the pressures of various social groups that required 
special treatment: women, war veterans, minorities, and so on. Thus, over 
the course of the 20th century, a pure merit system was modified, which 
began to take into account other aspects besides its objective characteris-
tics. Therefrom an opinion emerged that merit is not completely neutral, 
but rather that it is strongly influenced by what is considered as politically 
correct at the moment.
The topics that prevail in the late 20th and early 21st century relate to the 
real-world reach of the merit system, looking at the extent to which it is 
actually applied and what the results are. There are frequent criticisms of 
the merit system, however, not in the sense that the concept is flawed, but 
that there is a constant tendency to avoid it or apply it partially.6 
In the 21st century, some orthodox values  of the merit system and the 
degree of freedom that executive agencies need to have are still being 
questioned. Earlier enthusiasm for full autonomy (from politics) of execu-
tive agencies has raised the dilemma of whether partial politicisation (i.e., 
the appointment of top executives by political or party will) has its public 
benefits. It appears that the standpoint is that the right balance between 
political dependency and political independence of agencies is the best 
way to be effective. This implies that end-to-end solutions, such as the 
spoils principle of staff hiring and high political dependency on the one 
hand, and completely independent merit hiring on the other, reduce the 
efficiency of bureaucratic organisation, whereas balancing these two prin-
ciples is the best way to go. The basis of this approach is that not only the 
expertise of the staff is sufficient for the efficiency of the administrative 
organisation, but also the clear responsibility of the management to get 
the job done properly. Thus, expertise is provided through the merit sys-
6 For example, according to a survey conducted in the 1980s in the United States at 
the local level, in 85.5% of the cases personnel directors in cities with over 100,000 inhabit-
ants were found to be interacting with local elected officials and federal representatives 
concerning recruitment, selection, examinations, minority hiring, hiring of females, and the 
selection of individual job candidates (Stein, 1987, p. 263).
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tem and independent segments, but the responsibility of the organisation 
is ensured through political leadership (Krause, Lewis & Douglas, 2006).
When it comes to the merit system development on the European con-
tinent, it is difficult to speak generally because of the great diversity be-
tween European countries (especially Western and Eastern). Although 
the merit system’s roots are unique, each country’s merit-based civilian 
service has its own particular historical and cultural roots, with each coun-
try also borrowing from others. European countries where the historical 
evolution of merit systems provides references for others are the United 
Kingdom, France and former Prussia. The merit systems of most other 
European countries were based on the ideas and elements taken from 
these national frameworks (Cardona & Eriksen, 2015, p. 3).
Numerous research on the merit system in Europe is related to corrup-
tion, i.e., the question of the relationship between the merit system and 
corruption; and to the question why, in some European countries, merit 
is accepted and produces good results, while in others it is declaratively 
accepted, but not consistently implemented, and produces poor results.
In contemporary research on the merit system in Europe, much like in 
the USA, overcoming the strict division of politics and administration is 
noticeable, as well as the importance of a kind of permeation of these two 
spheres, which must control each other. In Europe, for a long time, the 
key features of bureaucracy that had an impact on combating (or prevent-
ing) corruption were: closed bureaucracy (formal exams special regime 
for bureaucrats), well-paid and professional bureaucracy (Dahlström, 
Lapuente & Teorell, 2015, p. 658). More recent research, however, shows 
that corruption actors across Europe are both officials and politicians, 
i.e., both groups can be a source of corruption. Therefore, the importance 
of mutual control and mutual monitoring of these two spheres (politics 
and administration), as well as openness to the citizens and the public 
in general, is emphasized. An extensive survey, conducted on the basis 
of data from 52 countries (from Europe and the world), on what the key 
features of a bureaucracy that acts to counteract corruption are, found it 
to be primarily recruitment based on merit. Interestingly, the same survey 
found that other elements of merit, which in most of the literature are 
considered to discourage corruption, such as: competitive wages, career 
stability, or closed bureaucracy, are not a relevant factor in combating 
corruption. So their conclusion is that employment in the bureaucracy is 
crucial for mutual monitoring of politics and bureaucracy, and that the 
mechanisms of eliminating temptation (through esprit de corps) are not so 
effective (Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell, 2015, p. 650).
424





3.  Public Administration and the Development of 
the Merit System in the Western Balkans
The last ten years have seen a number of academic works focusing on the 
topic of state building, public administration reform in post-socialist states, 
and the role and influence of political parties in this process. In her book, 
Rebuilding Leviathan: Party competition and state exploitation in post-commu-
nist democracies Anna Grzymała-Busse explains how political parties in Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia extract state resources and receive enormous infor-
mal profits from the privatisation of the communist economy, establishing 
discretionary structures of state administration instead of monitored, trans-
parent and responsible institutions (Grzymała-Busse, 2007).
In the context of the subject of this paper, the book Party patronage and 
party government in European democracies (Kopecký, Mair & Spirova, 2012) 
is also worth mentioning. It is a comprehensive comparative study of the 
role of political parties in public appointments in Europe, with new em-
pirical data that has not been collected or published to date since the 
publication of the book. Also, a reference should be made to the recently 
conducted research on party patronage in contemporary democracies and 
the results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions (Ko-
pecký et al., 2016).
A significant contribution to this topic comes from the study of informal 
politics in post-communist Europe as well as political parties, clientelism 
and state capture (Klíma, 2019).
However, it must be stressed that in these publications, when dealing with 
former socialist countries, the research deals with EU member states. 
Therefore, there is no talk of the Western Balkan countries. This points to 
the initial assumption given in the introduction, that this issue has been 
very poorly researched in the Western Balkan countries.
Historically as well as culturally, we can say that the Western Balkans’ 
position is a disincentive for the intensive implementation of the merit 
system.7 While in the USA and Western Europe there was a continuity 
of democratic states, institution building, confrontation with various ex-
periences and the gradual improvement of institutions, the Balkans was 
7 It is interesting that in the Serbo-Croatian language the word vlast (which means 
authority or government) is similar to the word vlasnik (owner) or vlastelin (landlord). The 
English words government and authority do not refer to ownership or to lordship.
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occupied with completely different activities and topics. For example, 
while the Trevelyan Report was being created in Britain, and while the 
US was largely talking about the evil called spoils, the Balkans were ruled 
by a decadent and obsolete Ottoman empire. The entire 19th century 
was unstable for the Western Balkans, followed by the 20th century with 
the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, two devastating world wars, and the final 
establishment of socialism that did not care about the merit system. The 
Communist Party was the absolute lord and master, deciding who was 
ideologically fit for public service and who was not. It was only with the 
fall of socialism (that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), that 
the issue of modernising the public administration came into the spot-
light, and within that, the merit system came to the agenda. However, 
decades of experiencing a complete overlapping between the ruling party 
and the state, with extensive state intervention and regulation during the 
socialist period, have made it very difficult to separate the spheres of pol-
itics and administration, which is one of the preconditions for democracy 
and public sector efficiency. In addition, the centralisation of political 
power that has persisted to this day constitutes an environment in which 
there is a strong reluctance to implement the merit system.
Therefore, in analysing the merit system in Europe, a distinction should 
be made between at least two groups of countries. The first group is made 
up of countries with traditionally well-established professional civil servic-
es, which are relatively independent of politics. The second group of coun-
tries emerged from a period of communist rule, where no distinction was 
apparent between political party apparatuses, public administration, and 
the idea of a state as a reality independent from both public administra-
tion and political party (Cardona, 2000, p. 1). A more detailed grouping 
can be done within the second group, whereby one group is made up of 
countries that implemented the reforms well and became EU members in 
2004, and countries that are still on the path of European integration, or 
have become EU member states, but still face serious challenges related 
to the merit system (in the first place the Western Balkans, and probably 
Bulgaria and Croatia can be added to this group).
A comparison of the merit systems of the countries of the Western Bal-
kans and Western Europe (the so-called old democracies), and the US, as 
well as their reach, would require a complex analysis that goes beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, what can be done in a more concise form 
is a comparison of a crucial element of the merit system: recruitment. 
Research (some of which is cited), as well as various reports (e.g., the 
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SIGMA reports)8 indicate that the merit system is often violated when 
applying for public service candidacies. 9
The report, A comparative overview of public administration characteristics 
and performance in EU28, states that Bulgaria, as well as Croatia, have a 
problem in the EU with the merit system.10
According to the SIGMA reports, the situation regarding the merit sys-
tems in the Western Balkans is poor. Although most countries of the West-
ern Balkans have introduced merit in formal and legal terms, the practical 
reach is weak. This situation is best illustrated by the quote that the “West-
ern Balkan states have made major efforts to institutionalize procedures 
that are supposed to ensure merit-based recruitment to civilian service and 
there are basic requirements such as compulsory advertising of vacancies, 
examination right of appeal against the outcomes of selection decisions. In 
spite of this, recruitment practices continue to be characterized by a high 
degree of informality and favoritism, the use and abuse of discretion, and a 
high degree of party patronage. International organizations including the 
European Commission have made major efforts to institutionalize merit 
recruitment in the Western Balkans, but the social, political and economic 
context fails to provide conditions for the professionalization of recruit-
ment practices” (Hinrik & Sahling, 2012, p. 32).
In short, the conclusion is that, as announced at the beginning of this 
paper, the legal form for a merit system exists, but not the will to put it 
into practice consistently. This finding is also supported by findings on the 
merit system’s development in the US and Canada.
8 SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) is a joint 
initiative of the OECD and the European Union. Its key objective is to strengthen the 
foundations for improved public governance, and hence support socio-economic develop-
ment through building the capacities of the public sector, enhancing horizontal governance 
and improving the design and implementation of public administration reforms, including 
proper prioritisation, sequencing and budgeting. Currently SIGMA works with Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey as 
EU candidate countries and potential candidates. More information can be found on the 
website http://www.sigmaweb.org/
9 “In particular, meritocratic recruitment of civil servants, as opposed to political ap-
pointment, is found to reduce corruption. A comparative assessment of indicators and national 
sources indicates a continuing high degree of patronage in many European public administra-
tions. Especially in Eastern and Southern European Member States, patronage is still a domi-
nant pattern of public administrations” (Thijs, Hammerschmid & Palaric, 2017, pp. 27-28).
10 Politicisation is also a continuous feature and one of the main problems in the Cro-
atian civil service. The problem has usually been approached in a formal manner, through 
law amendments and attempts to reshape the appointment procedure for managerial posi-
tions in public administration (Ibid. p. 28).
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There is another important difference between the merit system in the 
Western Balkans on one side, and the merit system in Western Europe 
and the US on the other. Namely, the introduction of the merit system 
in Western democracies was accompanied by the introduction of an in-
dependent commission, which played a key role in the selection of can-
didates for public service. These are reputable, independent commissions 
or agencies with high institutional power that play a key role in recruiting 
for public service but also protect the merit system and the honour of the 
officers. In addition, most importantly, they protect officials from political 
influence. For example, if an official in the United States suffers political 
pressure or mobbing or is fired, he or she may initiate a procedure after 
which, if he or she is proven innocent, he or she is compensated and pro-
moted. Of course, this implies the functioning of the judicial system, but 
also the existence of legal norms that ensure the protection of a public 
servant from political influence. In the Western Balkans there are also 
national bodies, such as the Human Resources Management Service in 
Serbia, however, their reach, power and overall importance in society are 
significantly smaller compared to analogous institutions in the West.
Another significant difference that can be noted between the Western 
Balkans and the West are the schools for public training and the educa-
tion of future public servants. In the Western Balkans, officer training is 
generally formal and general. On the other hand, in the West, there are 
special schools and academies that train future officials, not only provid-
ing them with the knowledge on regulations and public management, but 
also on the study of ethics and the codes of ethics, what an honourable 
officer is, and finally how to react in situations of political or any other 
pressure to act dishonestly and contrary to the law. Similar schools in the 
Western Balkans do not exist or are in their infancy.
4. The Spoils System in Serbia is Still Alive
One of the basic hypotheses of this paper is that the spoils system in Ser-
bia today largely lives in public sector practice, although formally speaking 
there is a merit system, or at least the minimum standards of one. As 
Serbia is in many ways similar to the surrounding countries, many of the 
assumptions and conclusions of this paper can be applied to other West-
ern Balkan countries.
Of course, a hypothesis like this is difficult to prove on the basis of official 
reports and data, because the circumvention of the merit system regula-
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tions is done carefully and perfidiously. Although the legal form is often 
satisfied when recruiting for public service, the bottom line is that the best 
candidate should be selected, but is not. Furthermore, a closer analysis 
of the regulations in Serbia indicates that there are also many gaps in the 
legal framework. For example, a merit system should permeate the entire 
public sector, however, most of the merit system rules apply to the state 
administration, but not to local self-governments and other segments of 
the public sector (e.g., public enterprises). The most common mecha-
nisms of employment in the state administration, local self-government 
and public enterprises will be briefly outlined. Together they represent a 
large part of the political parties’ spoils.
Most of the regulations of the merit system apply only to the state admin-
istration.11 Similar to other countries there is a central agency, the Human 
Resources Management Service (HRMS), that should take care of the 
personnel in public administration and set professional standards. How-
ever, this is a rather “weak” organisation compared to its counterparts 
in Western countries. First, the organisation’s only role in the process of 
public administration reform is support and assistance; and second, its 
activities relate primarily to the state administration staff (therefore, only 
to a small part of the public sector in Serbia). The role of the HRMS in the 
decision to recruit to the state administration is minimal (limited mainly 
to performing administrative and technical tasks, such as public advertis-
ing). The commission which decides on the admission of a new candidate 
to the state administration is appointed by the head of the state body 
(the minister), almost at will. There are no detailed provisions in the Law 
on Civil Servants (Zakon o državnim službenicima). In practice, the minis-
ter selects several employees, who are already employed, as members of 
the commission. After testing the candidates (although there are usually 
no written tests and most often the recruitment process is done through 
interviews), the committee submits a list of candidates who meet the cri-
teria for selection with the achieved candidate results, and submits it to 
the top manager, who is responsible for choosing the candidate that best 
meets the selection criteria. As testing is usually reduced to an interview, 
there is considerable discretion for the commission, and therefore for the 
11 The state administration in Serbia is very narrowly defined. According to the Law 
on State Administration, the public administration consists only of the ministries, and the 
so-called administrative bodies within the ministries and special organisations (Art. 1, Law 
on State Administration). Public Administration in Serbia is not a positive legal category, 
although there is a Strategy on public administration reform (Official Gazette, 9/2014, 
42/2014 - correction, and 54/2018).
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minister, to decide which candidate is the most successful. In order to 
understand more fully the employment situation in the state administra-
tion and the well-founded hypothesis that public competition is a mere 
form, another very common phenomenon in state administration should 
be pointed out, namely temporary employment on the basis of contracts.
Although the law stipulates that the state administration may hire staff 
based on a temporary contract only in specific and rare situations, this le-
gal instrument is widely and very often used. The mechanism is very simple 
and the ministry has considerable freedom in the implementation of this 
instrument. In practice, it is most often the case that “party soldiers” are 
first hired through contracts like this. These contracts are then most often 
renewed every three months, and possibly longer. During this time, the 
engaged person is not employed in formal or legal terms, nor has the status 
of a civil servant, but practically performs all the duties of a civil servant. 
It is superfluous to speak about the (in)dependence of such staff. After a 
certain period of time, when the authority (in fact the party headquarters), 
decides that it is time for one person to be completed and formally em-
ployed as a state servant, a public competition is announced. As a rule, a 
large number of candidates appear, including the preferred candidate that 
is already engaged. The commission members are actually the senior col-
leagues of the preferred candidate. Since the commission values  previous 
experience, and since the preferred member is practically already working 
in the ministry, the commission gives him a great number of points on the 
basis of which he defeats the other candidates (outsiders).12
Opportunities to avoid merit standards at the local level are even more 
numerous. HRMS is primarily a service of the central government, but 
not of local governments. Several paragraphs of the Law on Employees in 
Autonomous Provinces and Local Self-Government Units illustrate the degree 
of discretion and flexibility in hiring new employees in local government. 
Art. 101 of this Law states that the Head of Administration, Head of Ser-
vice or Organisation, by their decision, establishes a selection commission 
of three members, and of these three members one must be the direct 
manager of the organisational unit in which the position is to be filled 
and one must be hired in the field of human resource management. The 
selection of the third member is free. The discretion of the commission 
12 The author has gathered the presented information from several sources: personal 
experience (observation) while working for the state administration (2008-2011); interviews 
and (informal) conversations (narrative) with persons working in the public sector; and me-
dia reports.
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and the possibility of staging the results are particularly facilitated by the 
provision according to which the commission determines which profes-
sional competences, knowledge and skills will be tested in the selection 
procedure and the manner of their verification.
What happens in practice in local self-government in Serbia is pure trade; 
the “selling” of local government jobs for political services rendered during 
the campaign and election. Another name for this situation is the spoils 
system.
The core of the trouble within the spoils in this situation are the so-called 
reliable votes. Namely, the political parties that have won the local elec-
tion should satisfy the appetites of their members and party friends who 
have stood out during the election campaign, and certain votes are the 
most valued. The most active member of the party is the one who brings 
the most certain votes. According to some media reports, there are indi-
cations that local officials and party members are given a quota of certain 
votes during the election campaign that they must muster to justify their 
party’s confidence and to confirm or get a job (Danas, 2017). A reliable 
vote is obtained by offering and giving to citizens a variety of services: 
charity packages, a free checkup, firewood, work, or just money. The vot-
er, in return, undertakes to vote for a particular party in the forthcoming 
elections. Even a system for controlling whether a “certain” voter actually 
voted according to his promise was developed. One mechanism is to print 
more ballots than anticipated, so the functionary who provides the buying 
of a vote gives a ballot to a voter with an already rounded ballot, and the 
voter returns the blank sheet he received at the polling place. Of course, 
the one with the previously rounded choice is inserted into the ballot box. 
There are other methods of control, such as taking a ballot with a mobile 
phone after an agreed political party has been rounded up. Whatever the 
control, one of the basic principles of democratic elections, the secrecy of 
elections, is violated.
Since the key criterion for status and influence in the party is the collec-
tion of a certain number of votes, it is possible that a non-expert person 
may have greater influence on political decision-making in the party than 
one who has the appropriate qualifications and knowledge to deal with 
local politics in a quality manner. As such, an incompetent person in the 
following sequence of events, and in accordance with a job well done, 
having made a list with the largest number of potential voters, has cer-
tain privileges and benefits; e.g., the right to employ a number of people 
(friends, neighbours, relatives and those who pay him to get a job). Al-
though by law public vacancies for admission to a certain position in the 
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local administration must be announced, in practice this is not respected 
and is often bypassed. Public competitions are called for the purpose of 
simulation and formal adherence to the law, while the one for whom the 
position is intended is known in advance or even employed in that work-
place and employed by a directive from the top of the local authority.13
Due to the existence of this mechanism, some members of a political par-
ty advance on the party ladder without any visible knowledge or honour. 
Very often, local policy depends on people without real knowledge and/
or ethical integrity. With such party members who lack knowledge, prim-
itivism is generally manifested by the tendency to eliminate professional 
experts by the most primitive methods. So it could be deduced that the 
less education and necessary knowledge they possess, the more arrogant 
their methods; the lack of knowledge is covered by cruelty and bestiality. 
In addition, the consequences of the quality of public services received by 
citizens are extremely negative.
Another phenomenon that clearly indicates that political parties do not 
want to give up their spoils are public companies. Although it has been 
established by recent regulations that directors of public companies are to 
be elected in a public competition and that they have some independence 
in their work (Law on Public Enterprises, Art. 24-26), this is avoided in 
practice by the appointment of acting directors (Serbian: vršilac dužnosti). 
The legal basis for the appointment of acting director is Art. 52 and 53 of 
the Law on Public Enterprises. It is an instrument that is rather limited 
and should only be used in specific situations. According to this regula-
tion, the government (discreetly) appoints the acting director until the 
appointment of the public company after a public competition. Moreo-
ver, the term of office of the acting director may not exceed one year and 
the same person may not be appointed twice as acting director. However, 
according to media reports, “more than half of the directors of public 
companies and civil servants have been appointed by the Government 
of Serbia as acting directors. In this way, politically elected and easily 
replaceable personnel come to the highest positions in public enterprises, 
which often do not meet even the basic conditions stipulated by law” (In-
13 In addition to media reports, the author’s “insider” information confirms the ac-
curacy of this scenario. Specifically, some persons who have participated in or directly wit-
nessed such “transactions” talk about these processes, but only anonymously or in private 
conversations with a “trusted” person. Very few public sector employees are ready to speak 
about this publicly because of the fear of losing their jobs and other forms of retaliation by 
the centre of political, i.e., party power. 
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sajder, 2019). Furthermore, some rules are often violated, and one person 
commonly spends several years in the position of acting director.
150 years of experience in the merit system development, as well as nu-
merous experiences of European countries and assistance from the Euro-
pean Union and the OECD, are all a good basis for establishing reform 
directions that would lead the way to the realisation of the merit system 
in practice and the professionalisation of the public administration. SIG-
MA14 reports and guidelines offer very useful recommendations related to 
this topic (i.e., The Principles of Public Administration, SIGMA, 2017, 
pp. 38-52). In this sense, it is worth mentioning the analysis and recom-
mendations done by ReSPA (Regional School of Public Administration), 
that deal directly with the topic of the improvement of merit recruitment 
procedures in the Western Balkans (Sahling et al., 2015; Sahling et al., 
2019).
However, the problem is not what should be done, but whether there is 
the (political) will to do it. As previous experience has indicated, the mer-
it system was introduced when political parties did more harm than the 
benefits of the spoils system, thereby creating a broad consensus for the 
introduction of the merit system.
A solid explanation for the absence of the aforementioned political will is 
the concept of the so-called guild interests of parties. These are interests 
or benefits that apply to the entire political elite or politicians, regardless 
of party affiliation. This could be, for example, the broader increase in 
parliamentary immunity, the increase in parliamentary salaries, etc. It is 
also in their interest to have as much political spoil as possible: controlling 
state bodies, institutions, public companies, etc. (Goati, 2008, p. 71).
On the other hand, the effective operation of the party in modern con-
ditions also requires pecuniary competence. In Serbia, most of the party 
budgets are contributions from the state budget that belong to the parties 
by law. However, in theory and practice, there are numerous other sourc-
es of party financing, including the so-called party taxes. This is a situation 
whereby a person who gains public office and who is a member of a par-
ticular party, commits to giving an increased membership fee or simply a 
14 SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) is a joint 
initiative of the OECD and the European Union. Its key objective is to strengthen the fo-
undations for improved public governance, and hence support socio-economic development 
through building the capacities of the public sector, enhancing horizontal governance and 
improving the design and implementation of public administration reforms, including pro-
per prioritisation, sequencing and budgeting. More: http://sigmaweb.org/about/
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contribution to the party. Public companies are a large part of the “party 
booty” and in addition to the party tax, they often serve to “take care of 
party soldiers” (Stančetić, 2015a, pp. 78-79).
5. Conclusion
Perhaps the question that is more difficult to answer than proving the 
hypothesis that the spoils system lives on in practice, is what reform steps 
must be taken to make the merit system a reality.
In order to answer this question, several aspects need to be considered:
– Historical heritage and factors (discontinuities, traditional distrust of 
government and institutions, from the time of the Ottoman Empire 
to the present day);
– The legacy of the socialist period (big state, party state) and as a con-
sequence:
– Existing political and party system, and political culture.
One of the key reasons why spoils persists in practice is the win-win sit-
uation for the immediate participants, i.e., the party (politician) and the 
person receiving the award in the form of employment in the public sec-
tor. The key to a solution is to translate this game from a win-win to a 
no-win game for at least one actor, and ideally for both. In other words, a 
new ambience that does not favour a spoil transaction should be created, 
or an ambience where at least one party (or player) does not want a “spoil 
transaction”. Nevertheless, what exactly needs to be done?
We shall commence with a politician who wants to be successful and get 
re-elected. The key question is what “successful” means and what is cru-
cial for his/her success. In Serbia, loyalty to the party is the key, as well 
as media support that the party provides (media freedoms in Serbia are 
weak, most of the media is controlled by the ruling party). This means 
that the existing system that produces a power concentration for a small 
number of people or even one person should be disaggregated to create 
a situation in which the success of politicians depends primarily on citi-
zen satisfaction. One of the key steps to achieving this is a new electoral 
system.
The existing electoral system responds to partial party interests, or more 
precisely to party leaders and to the interest groups behind them. They 
seek to keep the political arena closed so that no new forces or “fresh 
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energy” can enter the political scene to threaten them. They also seek 
to keep MPs under control. Therefore, MPs or political representatives 
are primarily in the service of the party, not the citizens. This is possible 
because of the electoral system. In fact, there are no truly direct elections 
in Serbia, since there is a mediator between the citizens and the elect-
ed representatives, which are the political parties. Thus, citizens vote for 
parties, and then parties decide who will represent the citizens, and not 
only that, but also how they will behave in the assembly. Because of that, 
a new electoral system should be built, which would enable high-quality 
and integrity-minded people who have a stronghold in the electorate, and 
not only in the party base, to come to public office.
From this basic goal comes the need for two key changes. Firstly, the 
opening of the political arena, i.e., the release of the political market, 
which means the removal of numerous barriers to candidacy and entry 
into the election race. Secondly, elimination of the mediation between cit-
izens (voters) and elected representatives, that is, strengthening the link 
between the deputy and his electoral base, which can be achieved through 
the introduction of the principle of elections personalisation.
Especially at the local level, elections should be personalised, and mayors 
should be elected directly. Direct election of mayors binds them more to 
the citizens and their needs. In such circumstances, the mayors would 
demand more competencies, which would increase the pressure for the 
decentralisation of Serbia. Greater democratic legitimacy as well as great-
er competencies would make them more accountable, and thus more in-
terested in the citizens’ satisfaction and efficient performance of public 
affairs. In addition, there is a need to work on the emancipation of the 
local self-government and even local party committees from central gov-
ernment and party headquarters. To this end, the emergence of local and 
regional parties may be encouraged, or the rule may be that local elections 
are not held at the same time as parliamentary elections.
Another concrete activity to consider is the establishment of a truly inde-
pendent commission for the selection of public administration personnel 
and the care of the merit system. It would be a relief for those politicians 
who have gained success and political standing thanks to the citizens, 
and not just the party, in a situation where they are pressured to recruit 
new people to the administration (according to contra-merit principles). 
It should be remembered that although parties want many memberships 
and various forms of support, sometimes it can lead to potential risks and 
costs for party. This happens when all the members cannot be satisfied 
and start acting against the party (Goati, 2008, p. 127).
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In short, generally speaking, changes that open up the political scene and 
increase political competition, which has a beneficial effect on the actual 
functioning of the merit system, should be introduced. This leads to the im-
portant conclusion that the merit system cannot be introduced or improved 
only by changing the regulations, but should be viewed in the context of 
overall governance reform in which political parties will no longer want to 
function within the spoils system because it then becomes unprofitable.
Finally, the question is also under what conditions the second player, the 
candidate for public service, does not want to spoil the game. The answer 
lies in professional qualification and ethical integrity. A highly educated 
and trained person naturally does not want to buy his workplace because 
he has already invested years of work and effort into his abilities. How-
ever, for such people to exist there must be good schools and colleges 
to prepare them for public service work. Without a good and sufficient 
number of public administration schools, the merit system is unlikely to 
achieve satisfactory results.
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SPOILS SYSTEM IS NOT DEAD: THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MERIT SYSTEM IN WESTERN BALKANS
Summary
The paper analyses the development of the merit system and its effectiveness in the 
administrations of the Western Balkan countries. First, the development of the merit 
concept is described; its origin and genesis, as well as the positive effects it has had 
mostly in Western democracies. However, the basic hypothesis presented in the paper 
is that in most Western Balkan countries, the spoils system still remains a reality, 
even though the law stipulates the merit system. This hypothesis is demonstrated thro-
ugh practical evidence, as well as by comparing the merit system in the Western Bal-
kans with that of Western democracies, in both a formal and a practical sense. The 
paper also analyses the negative consequences of this situation, as well as the benefits 
that the citizens would have in a merit system. In addition, solutions are offered, i.e., 
a model of reform that would overcome the existing situation.
Keywords: spoils system, merit system, public administration, political party, 
reliable vote
SUSTAV PLIJENA NIJE MRTAV: RAZVOJ I UČINKOVITOST 
SUSTAVA SPOSOBNOSTI U ZEMLJAMA ZAPADNOG BALKANA
 Sažetak 
Rad analizira razvoj sustava sposobnosti i njegovu primjenu u javnim upravama 
zemalja Zapadnog Balkana. Objašnjeni su razvoj koncepta sposobnosti, nje-
govi izvori i geneza te njegov pozitivan učinak u zapadnim zemljama. Glavna 
je hipoteza da je u većini zemalja Zapadnoga Balkana sustav plijena i dalje 
realnost unatoč pravnim pokušajima da se uvede sustav sposobnosti. Autor svoju 
tezu elaborira dokazima iz prakse te usporedbom primjene sustava sposobnosti 
u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana te u zapadnoj Europi u formalnom i praktič-
nom smislu. Rad analizira negativne posljedice takva stanja i koristi koje bi 
građani imali kad bi se u javnim upravama njihovih zemalja primijenio sustav 
sposobnosti. U radu se predlaže model reforme koja bi vodila rješavanju posto-
jeće situacije.
Ključne riječi: sustav plijena, sustav sposobnosti, javna uprava, politička stran-
ka, čvrsti glas
